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Abstract
The paper aims at presenting both determinants and applied approaches of debt limits in local governments. There are especially 
characterized practices introduced in Poland in this field after 1990. Thus, significance of some economic and financial variables,
which affected the debt ratio growth of local governments in Poland between 1995 and 2013, was verified. The estimated 
regression models imply that growth of share of the debt in the revenues was significantly affected by the financial situation in 
the public finance sector and in the local government sector as well as by the cost of capital there. Hence, the ability of incurring 
the debt could be reliant on the fiscal variables and calculated individually, as it has been introduced in Poland since 2014.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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Introduction
In literature there is a concept that an introduction of regulations limiting the size of the debt in local 
governments results from not sufficient economic mechanism that if the level of the debt would rise excessively the 
growing cost of credit constrains from further borrowing. However, there are at least three issues which interfere 
with it. Firstly, a bankruptcy of local government is often unacceptable for political reasons and rarely applied. 
Secondly, there might be restricted access of creditors to some sensitive information. Thirdly, in many cases local 
governments are reluctant to implement some radical actions in order to improve their financial situation and 
creditworthiness (Wiewióra, 2009). On the other hand, these limitations realize some functions, such as: mitigate the 
impact of the local debt on the general government debt or reduce the likelihood of a bankruptcy of the unit and its 
negative consequences. Thus, they also prevent local financial irresponsibility with its concomitant overtaxation and 
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default on municipal obligations (Secrist, 1972). Moreover, they are aimed at increasing the share of resources other 
than debt which cover the spending program (Pogue, 1970). Moreover, some researchers claim that a growth of 
subnational public debt is frequently a symptom of an inappropriate system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
the country. It involves large vertical or horizontal imbalances as well as an organization of intergovernmental
transfers lacking transparent criteria and conducive to ad hoc bargaining or ex post gap filling (Ter-Minassian & 
Craig, 1997). Despite these issues debt limits on local governments are applied worldwide. So, the question remains 
about their effectiveness. Hence, they should be based on proper determinants. Therefore, the aim of the study is to 
characterize the influence of some economic, financial and fiscal variables on the growth of the debt ratio. The 
author reviewed the literature in this field, whereas in the empirical part of the paper the ordinary least squares
method is applied based on the adequate data determining the financial situation in local governments in Poland 
between 1995 and 2013.
1. Concepts of debt limits in local governments and their determinants – the literature review
1.1. Approaches to the debt control system in local government
Considering national approaches to the control of subnational debt it is seen that they can be grouped into four 
broad categories (Ter-Minassian & Craig, 1997), i.e.: 1) primary reliance on market discipline; 2) cooperation by 
different levels of government in the system of debt controls; 3) rules-based controls; and 4) administrative controls.
The first concept envisages some conditions, such as: free and open financial market, full accessibility into the 
financial information of the borrower, no perceived chance of bailout of the lenders in the case of impending default 
and existing institutional structures in the borrower that ensure adequate policy responsiveness to market signals 
before reaching the point of exclusion from new credits. In this solution an adequate base of own revenues 
(especially local taxes) is also indicated. It means that local authorities ought to possess the instruments to finance 
additional spending (Ter-Minassian, 2007). 
In turn, a cooperative approach to the debt controls postulates the active role of local governments in formulating 
macroeconomic and fiscal parameters (e.g. revenues, expenditures, deficit etc.) to be reached. It assumes both 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations. This kind of dialogue between tiers of government has the potential to ensure 
coordination of macroeconomic policy. Simultaneously, it does not automatically imply a central government 
guarantee for subnational borrowing (Singh & Plekhanov, 2005).
In the rules-based approaches to the control of subnational debt there are legal regulations both in the field of its 
level and the purpose. The level is limited mainly by means of specific ratios, in which the debt is referred to some 
key budget variables (e.g. revenues) or might be even determined by economic indicators (e.g. General Government 
Debt, Gross Domestic Product etc.). Denison et al. note that there is no direct link between debt limits (ratios) and 
debt capacity, because debt limits might be affected by the attitude of the state into the borrowing (Levine, Justic & 
Scorsone, 2013) and constitute debt ceilings in these units. Hence, the debt limits which are constructed individually 
in the units (depend on the fiscal categories of each local budget) might be considered in a greater extent as 
indicators of creditworthiness.
Apart from that, in some economies (mainly in industrial countries) are enacted fiscal rules, in which the debt 
must have investment-oriented purpose. This concept indicates that only such borrowing is beneficial. Therefore, it 
is prohibited to introduce the deficit in the current part of the budget (golden rule - current expenditures cannot 
exceed current revenues) (Liu & Waibel, 2010). This refers to the division of the debt into the long-term – for 
investments purposes and short-term, aimed at maintaining a financial liquidity in the unit. Simultaneously, the 
short-term credits should be paid in the same fiscal year (Ter-Minassian & Craig, 1997). Thereby, the debt for 
investment purposes is accepted because its costs are shared with the future generation, which benefit from new 
assets (infrastructure) (Schwarcz, 2002). Although this kind of debt control is transparent, even-handed and easy to 
monitor, it may develop the practices circumventing the rules. They especially concern issues of reclassification of 
expenditures from current to capital, transferring some activities and borrowing into local government-owned 
enterprises or using debt instruments (e.g. sale and leaseback arrangements) that are not included in the debt limits. 
In emerging economies there are especially two types of debt thresholds, i.e. limit on outstanding debt level and 
limit on maximum annual debt service (Josifov, Pamfil, Comsa, et. al. 2011). Moreover, this system can be 
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expanded not only by the quantitative constraints but also by the qualitative regulations on possible debt 
instruments. Apart from financial instrument, currency or the market, even the debt maturity might be restricted 
(Wiewióra, 2009). Furthermore, some countries lay down detailed eligibility criteria that determine which local 
governments are permitted to borrow. These regulations are based on the soundness of the subnational government 
policy and administrative procedures as well as the nature of projects financed by incurring the debt (Allen & 
Tommasi, 2001). 
As far as the administrative control is concerned it may take various forms, including the setting of annual limits 
on the overall debt of individual subnational jurisdictions, prohibition of some borrowing (e.g. external), review and 
authorization of individual credit operations or centralization of all public finance borrowing. Administrative 
procedures introduce strict controls over local government credit activity, while preserving a flexible fiscal policy. 
This approach ensures some coordination of the country’s external borrowing (Singh & Plekhanov, 2005). 
1.2. Determinants of the indebtedness of local governments
There are several researches examining both local government debt level, its growth and the determinants. L. G. 
Veiga and F. J. Veiga analysed lots of variables on fiscal (e.g. investment expenditures in total expenditures, interest 
payments of debt in total expenditures, own revenues in total revenues without loans), socio-economic (e.g. 
unemployment, earnings, type of the area, building permits or touristic facilities per inhabitant) as well as political 
situation (e.g. election cycle or issues of a ruling party). Their research indicates inter alia that a structure of 
expenditures and revenues affects the debt, whereas higher unemployment rates generate higher debt (Veiga & 
Veiga, 2014). In this kind of analysis political issues are taken into account because there is a concept that debt may 
be the consequence of strategic behaviour by politicians, where it is increased to compromise future governments’ 
policy options (Ashworth, Geys & Heyndels, 2005). In turn, R. W. Wassmer, R. C. Fisher included in their study 
economic (e.g. real gross state product per capita, unemployment rate) fiscal (e.g. balance in expenditures, grants to 
local government, existed debt limit), social (e.g. percentage of population greater or equal to age 65, population in 
public schools) and political aspects (e.g. political ideology which varies from 0 – conservative to 100 – liberal). 
They showed that local government debt had clearly increased with GDP, but the amount of debt outstanding had 
not risen with the amount of local government revenues (Wassmer & Fisher, 2011). Influence of political issues on 
local governments’ debt is also presented by E. Leonardo and S. Letelier. During the research they put numerous 
hypotheses. One of them assumes that conservative coalitions are more likely to abide by the rules (Leonardo & 
Letelier, 2011). B. Benito and F. Bastida observed that as the electoral year had approached municipalities had 
exceeded the limits in higher percentage (Benito & Bastida, 2004). In the other studies structure and organization of 
local public finance are examined (Dafflon, 2002). In turn, J. R. Aroson and J. L. Hilley indicated that borrowing in 
local governments was influenced by the business cycle, which also determined the structure of the debt. Hence, in 
the period of the economic slowdown credits have a tendency to grow. Furthermore, the high interest rate prevents 
local governments from borrowing for a long term (Aroson & Hilley, 1986).  However, M. T. Balaguer-Coll, D. 
Prior and E. Tortosa-Ausina specify other variables, such as: economic activity, density of residence or issues of 
decentralization, which might be tied with the debt (Balaguer-Coll, Prior & Tortosa-Ausina, 2014).
In turn, A. Plekhanov and R. Singh examined the effectiveness of borrowing constraints. In the research a lot of 
variables in the field of decentralization, expenditure management, governance, cost of debt service, politics, 
demography, economic development, federal structure or size of the government were studied. The empirical results 
suggest inter alia that no single institutional arrangement seems to be superior to all the others under all 
circumstances. Simultaneously, borrowing constraints may be enforced in different ways (Plekhanov & Singh, 
2007).
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2. Debt limits in local governments in Poland since 1990 and their determinant
2.1. Evolution of debt limitations in local governments in Poland since 1990
In 1990 local government was reactivated in Poland. In this year, the Local Government Act introduced 
regulations in which short-term loans in each local government could not exceed 5% of the planned expenditures in 
the budget year (LGA, 1990). In turn, between 1991 and 1993, the community might borrow money in order to
(CRA, 1990):
x finance current expenditures during the year, if these loans are repaid with the interest in the year in which they 
are incurred. Concurrently, the debt cannot exceed 8% of the planned annual expenditure in the first half of the 
year and 4% in the second half;
x finance expenditures which are not covered by revenues, if the amount of loan instalments with the interest 
would not exceed 5% of the planned expenditures in the year. In 1993, it was changed into the level of 10%
(AoC, 1993).
Whereas, limitations existed between 1994 and 1998 assumed that the debt to be paid in the year (credits, loans, 
redemption of securities, guarantees, etc.) could not exceed 15% of the planned revenues (AFC, 1993).
In 1999 significant amendments were introduced into this system, which were accompanied by the administrative 
reform of the local government in Poland (apart from communities, there were introduced provinces and 
voivodships – regions). As a result, the unit could take loans and credits or issue securities to finance budgetary 
shortages within a year (this kind of the debt ought to be paid during the same year), expenditures which are not 
covered by the planned revenues as well as earlier repayment of the debt (this provision was added in 2003). 
Moreover, the total debt at the end of the year could not exceed 60% of the revenues. Whereas, the total debt, which 
had to be paid in the budgetary year, could not exceed 15% of the planned revenues or 12% if the public debt to 
GDP would exceed 55% (PFA, 1998).
However, the ground-breaking regulation was implemented from 2014. As a result, debt limitation is estimated 
separately for each local government. Thus, the share of the planned credit instalments, redemption of securities 
along with the service costs and guarantees in total revenues cannot exceed the three year average of the operating 
surplus (positive difference between current revenues and current expenditure) together with revenues from the sale 
of assets in total revenues. It should be also mentioned that since 2011 in Poland, it is forbidden to enact the local 
budget, in which planned current expenditures exceed expected current revenues with the budget surplus from 
previous years and free resources. Therefore, the growth of the debt does not result from the deficit in the current 
part of the budget and actually finances investment activity of the unit (PFA, 2009).
2.2. Determinants of the debt ratio growth in local government in Poland – methodology and research findings
In Poland revenues of local governments consists of own-revenues, subsidies and grants. In 2013 they had a share 
in total revenues respectively of 50%, 22% and 28%, whereas the share of capital expenditures in total expenditures 
was 19% (MF, 2015). For most of the period 1995-2013 their budgets generated deficits and it was also observed a 
deficit in the public finance sector. Therefore, the growing debt in local governments has become a permanent fiscal 
category there. As a result, between 1995 and 2013 its share in total revenues of these units increased from 5.8% to 
37.7% (fig. 1) In the whole analyzed period there was a positive GDP growth. In turn, a substantial drop of a 
rediscount rate resulted in a cheaper access to capital. The mentioned reform of the organizational structure of local
government from 1999 also affected the growth of decentralization.
In order to verify the significance of determinants (Xt) on the growth of the share of the debt in total revenues 
(%) (Yt) in local government in Poland between 1995 and 2013 (T=19) there is applied ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method. There are estimated three linear regression models (1) verifying significance of the impact of some 
economic and fiscal variables (fig. 1), which, as it was characterized in the paper, are examined in the various 
studies.
௧ܻ =  ߚ଴ +  ߚ௧ܺ௧ +  Ɋ (1)
where: Yt – the growth of the share of the debt in total revenues (%),
ȕ0 – constant term,
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ȕ t – vector of coefficients,
Xt – regressors (fig. 1),
µ – error term of the model.
In each model the error has been verified to test OLS assumptions. The estimated models fulfil the conditions of 
no autocorrelation (LM test), homoscedasticity (White test) and normal distribution of the error (Doornik-Hansen 
test) (table 1).
Among the estimated models, the most fitted data are in model 1 (adjusted R-squared = 0.514).  It results from 
the fact that it contains two (out of four) variables, which significantly determined the changes of the share of the 
debt in total revenues of the local governments in Poland between 1995 and 2013. There are variables specifying the 
cost of capital (debt) and financial situation of local government. Model 2 also includes the variable which, apart 
from the cost of capital, significantly affected analysed growth of the debt ratio, i.e. public finance deficit in GDP.
Thus, the lower deficits were, the lower growth of the debt ratio appeared. None of the estimated models indicates 
the significant influence of the GDP growth on the debt ratio growth in local government in Poland between 1995 
and 2013. Moreover, in each model it was investment activity of local government, and in model 3 variable defining 
the process of decentralization.
Fig. 1. Variables influencing the financial situation in local governments in Poland between 1995 and 2013 (%) (CSO, 2015; Markowska-
Bzducha, 2004; .RSDĔVND NCRAC, 2015, MF, 2015)
Table 1. Variables determining debt ratio growth in local governments in Poland between 1995 and 2013 (T=19)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 2
const -0.413
(17.522)
-30.203
(20.297)
-73.329
(45.082)
GDP growth 0.480
(1.791)
-0.586
(1.990)
-1,917
(2.090)
Rediscount Rate 0.974**
(0.341)
1.038**
(0.398)
1.757**
(0.755)
Local Capital Expenditures in Total 
Expenditures
-0.558
(1.034)
0.315
(1.103)
1.098
(1.150)
Local Budget Balance in Revenues -4.494***
(1.248)
- -
Public Finance Budget in GDP - -5.911**
(2.374)
-
Local Expenditures in GDP - - 5.121
(3.562)
Adjusted R-squared 0.514 0.352 0.185
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Autocorrelation (LM test) [0.980] [0.550] [0.492]
Heteroscedasticity (White test) [0.434] [0.698] [0.182]
Normality [0.031] [0.240] [0.916]
Remarks:1) under the parameters there are standard errors of estimation; 2) significance of parameters: *** - p-
value: 0.01, ** - p-value: 0.05, * - p-value: 0.1; 3) results of statistical tests reported as p-value.
3. Conclusion
There are various approaches to the debt limitation in local governments. The effectiveness of their functioning 
depends on the specificity of the economy or the organization of the public finance sector and the local government.
Nevertheless, the implementation of a certain system should be preceded by determining its aim. It means that the 
structure of the limits ought to realize some goals. The empirical study shows that in Poland the debt limit growth 
was significantly determined by the variables concerning the financial situation both in the public finance sector and 
in the local governments as well as a cost of capital. Therefore, the change of the debt limitation, which was 
implemented in 2014 there, seems to be appropriately modified. The ability of the borrowing in the unit is affected 
by its fiscal situation, especially by the size of the surplus in the current part of the budget. In this approach the debt 
limit is not only a debt ceiling, constituted by the regulator, but also a measure of creditworthiness and requires the 
investment orientation of the debt. Moreover, the estimated models do not indicate the significant influence of the 
GDP growth and the process of decentralization on the analysed debt ratio growth. It was rising regardless of the 
level of the investments activity. Therefore, it shows some dysfunctions within the system of local government 
revenues or tasks in Poland, which could lead to financial shortages there.
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